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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order Regarding Part ll and Part Ill of the lnformation in which the district court 
concluded that although one of the defendant's prior judgments of conviction for 
driving under the influence was admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, it 
was not admissible under I.C. § 9-312 or 28 U.S.C. 5 1738.' 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Jim Howard with driving under the influence ("DUI") and 
driving without privileges. (R., pp.38-39, 42-43.) The state also alleged, in an 
lnformation Parts II and Ill, respectively, that Howard had two prior convictions 
for DUI within ten years and that he is a persistent violator. (R., pp.39, 42-43.) 
Howard pled not guilty. 
Prior to opening statements, Howard pled guilty to the driving without 
privileges charges and proceeded to trial only on the DUI charge. (R, Vol. II, 
p.273.) The jury was, however, unable to reach a verdict on whether Howard 
was guilty of DUI and the court declared a mistrial. (R., Vol. I, p.144.) At the 
conclusion of the retrial, the jury returned a verdict finding Howard guilty of DUI. 
(R., Vol. 11, p.234.) Howard agreed to submit to a court trial on the lnformation 
Part II and the persistent violator enhancement. (R., Vol. 11, p.273.) 
' The state is not challenging the court's conclusion that the judgments offered in 
support of the persistent violator enhancement (Part Ill) were not admissible 
under the rules of evidence. 
At the court trial, the state offered, as evidence, the judgment from 
Howard's prior DUI conviction in Kern County California ("California Judgment") 
and the judgment from his prior DUI conviction in Kootenai County. (Tr., pp.237- 
262; Exhibits 79 and 8.) Howard objected, arguing the California Judgment was 
inadmissible because, he claimed, it was not properly authenticated as required 
by I.R.E. 902, and did not comply with 28 U.S.C. 3 1738, the Full Faith and Credit 
clause of the United States Constitution, or I.C. § 9-312. (Tr., p.237, L.25 - 
p.238, L.23; R., Vol. 11, pp.258-61.) The district court concluded both judgments 
were admissible under I.R.E. 803(6),' but ultimately rejected the California 
Judgment finding it was not entitled to "full faith and credit" because it did not 
comply with I.C. 9-312 or 28 U.S.C. § 1738. (R., Vol. 11, pp.276-82.) Thus, the 
court concluded, Howard was not guilty of the DUI enhancement. (R., Vol. 11, 
p.282.) The state timely appealed. (R., pp.233-35.) 
'The court also took judicial notice of the Kootenai County judgment. ( ~ r . ,  p.262, 
Ls.12-17.) 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in excluding evidence of the California Judgment under 
I.C. § 9-312 or 28 U.S.C. 3 1738 even though it was admissible under the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Concludina The California Judgment, Althouah 
Admissible Under The ldaho Rules Of Evidence, Could Not Be Considered For 
Enhancement Purposes Because It Did Not Complv With I.C. 5 9-312 Or 28 
U.S.C. 5 1738 
A. Introduction 
Although the California Judgment offered by the state in support of the 
DUI enhancement was admissible under the ldaho Rules of Evidence, the district 
court refused to consider it to prove the enhancement, concluding it was not 
entitled to "full faith and credit" because it did not comply with I.C. § 9-312 or 28 
U.S.C. § 1738. The district court's conclusion was erroneous because the ldaho 
Rules of Evidence control the admissibility of evidence and whether the 
California Judgment is entitled to full faith and credit for other purposes is 
irrelevant to the court's admission of evidence of the judgment to prove a prior 
conviction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and application of a statute is a legal question over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 ldaho 
471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007). 
C.  Howard's California Judqment Was Admissible And Should Have Been 
Considered Bv The District Court For Purposes Of Determining Whether 
The State Proved The DUI Enhancement 
The district court specifically found the California Judgment admissible 
under the ldaho Rules of Evidence. (Tr., p.247, Ls.3-6.) The court, however, 
concluded it could not give the California Judgment "full faith and credit as the 
requirements of I.C. § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 were not met." (R., Vol. 11, 
p.282.) This conclusion was erroneous. 
In order to prove the DUI enhancement, the state was only required to 
produce certified copies of judgments indicating Howard had previously been 
convicted of two DUls within Zen years. I.C. § 18-8005(5); I.R.E. 803(8), 902(4); 
see State v. Medrain, 143 ldaho 329, 333, 144 P.3d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 2006) ("a 
-
certified copy of a judgment of conviction" along with evidence establishing 
identity of person formerly convicted is sufficient to prove persistent violator 
enhancement); State v. Smith, 116 ldaho 553, 560, 777 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (in order to prove persistent violator enhancement, "the state needed 
only to produce copies of judgments specifically identifying the crimes as 
felonies, or - if the judgments were not so specific - to offer admissible copies of 
the felony statutes applicable to the crimes recited in the judgments"). The state 
met its burden by introducing Exhibits 76 and 8, certified copies of Howard's prior 
judgments of conviction for DUI from California and Kootenai County, which the 
court deemed admissible under the ldaho Rules of Evidence. 
The state was not further obligated to comply with I.C. § 9-312, which 
provides for authentication of a "judicial record" "of another state . . . by the 
attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a clerk and 
seal, together with a certificate of the chief judge or presiding magistrate, that the 
attestation is in due form,"3 because a statutory provision that purports to govern 
The district court concluded the California Judgment did not comply with I.C. 3 
9-312 because it did not include "a certificate of the chief judge or presiding 
magistrate." (R., Vol. 11, p.279.) 
- . . . . ,  -_-5 
the admissibility of evidence that is in conflict with the rules of evidence is of no 
force or effect. State v. Martinez, 125 ldaho 445, 450, 872 P.2d 708, 713 (1994) 
(citing State v. Zimmerman, 121 ldaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861, 864 (1992) and 
State v. Griffith, 97 ldaho 52, 539 P.2d 604 (1975)). 
The district court's reliance on State v. Prince, 64 ldaho 343, 132 P.2d 146 
(1942), and State v. Martinez, 102 ldaho 875, 643 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1982), for a 
contrary conclusion is misplaced. In Prince, the state charged the defendant with 
being a persistent violator based, in part, on a prior conviction from Oregon. 64 
ldaho a t ,  132 P.2d at 147. On appeal, Prince asserted the evidence was 
insufficient to support the persistent violator enhancement because, he argued, 
the state failed to prove the Oregon court had jurisdiction to enter judgment 
against him. Id. Operating on the premise that "it was necessary for the state to 
establish upon the trial that the Oregon Court had jurisdiction," the court analyzed 
the "method of proof of jurisdiction of the Oregon Court." Id. at -, 132 P.2d at 
148. In doing so, the court first referenced the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
United States Constitution and its requirement that "public Acts, Records, and 
Judicial Proceedings of every other State" be given full, faith and credit in the 
manner prescribed by Congress. Id. The court then cited the manner prescribed 
by Congress, as set forth in 28 U.S.C.A. 3 687, which read: 
The records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any State or 
Territory, or of any such country, shall be proved or admitted in any 
other court within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk, 
and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a 
certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, that 
the said attestation is in due form. And the said records and judicial 
proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit 
given to them in every court within the United States as they have 
by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are 
taken. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
-
The court further cited I.C.A. § 16-310 (now codified as I.C. 9 9-312), and 
concluded that because the judgments offered complied "with the provisions of 
the Federal Constitution, the Act of Congress 128 U.S.C. § 6871, and Section 16- 
310," they "were admissible in evidence, and entitled to the same faith and credit 
which would have been accorded to them in the State of Oregon," and, as such, 
"established as a matter of fact and by a presumption of law," that the Oregon 
courts had jurisdiction to enter judgment against Prince. Prince, 64 ldaho at -, 
132 P.2d at 148. 
The district court concluded Prince "tells us that" "[c]ompliance with both 
ldaho Code § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 is mandatory." (R., Vol. 11, p.279.) 
This conclusion is incorrect. Prince merely indicates that compliance with I.C. 3 
9-312 and 28 U.S.C. 1738 satisfied the then-existing authentication 
requirements for admissibility and proof of jurisdiction, not that compliance with 
those provisions is "mandatory." Even if the statutory requirement set forth in I.C. 
3 9-312 was considered mandatory when Prince was issued in 1942, that statute 
predates I.R.E. 803, adopted in 1985, and is no longer controlling in relation to 
the proper method for authentication. Martinez, 125 Idaho at 450, 872 P.2d at 
713 (citing Zimmerman, 121 ldaho at 974, 829 P.2d at 864, and Griffith, 97 ldaho 
52, 539 P.2d 604). 
In Martinez, the relevant issue on appeal was whether the evidence 
admitted at trial for purposes of proving a persistent violator enhancement was 
admissible. 102 Idaho at 880, 643 P.2d at 560. One of the judgments at issue 
was a "certified copy of a 1973 federal judgment of conviction," which the court of 
appeals noted "complied with Idaho's requirement for proper authentication of a 
judicial record, I.C. s 9-312."~ id. (emphasis added). Even if compliance with I.C. 
§ 9-312 was "required" when Martinez was issued in 1982, as with Prince, that 
case and the statute upon which it relies predates the applicabie rule of evidence 
and, therefore, is no longer controlling, 
The district court's conclusion that it could not give "full faith and credit" to 
the California Judgment because it did not include the certification required by 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 is also erroneous. Section 1738, 28 U.S.C., is the substantial 
equivalent of 28 U.S.C. § 687, which was referenced in Prince. Section 1738 
reads: 
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or 
Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be 
authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or 
Possession thereto. 
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any 
such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be 
proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its 
Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal 
of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a 
judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form. 
Notably, although the court of appeals found the judgment complied with I.C. § 
9-312, it did not indicate the judgment was accompanied by a "certificate of the 
chief judge or presiding magistrate" - the deficiency found by the district court in 
this case with respect to the California Judgment. Rather, the court of appeals 
only stated that the judgment "was proved by the attestation of the clerk of the 
United States District Court, for the Central District of California" and that the 
"seal of that court was annexed to that attestation." Martinez, 102 ldaho at 880, 
643 P.2d at 560. 
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies 
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in 
every court within the United States and its Territories and 
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 
State, Terriiory or Possession from which they are taken. 
28 U.S.C. § 1738. 
Section 1738 is not a rule of evidence governing state evidentiary issues 
(or federal evidentiary issues for that matter); it merely requires state courts to 
give full faith and credit to judgments properly authenticated under its provisions. 
As such, it was not relevant to the district court's determination regarding the 
admissibility of the California Judgment. Indeed, even a judgment offered in 
federal court as proof of a prior conviction is not required to comply with 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 as long as it is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
As explained by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 
1075 (9" Cir. 2005): 
Weiland makes a strained argument that $j 1738 creates 
heightened evidentiary requirements for the admission of the 
records of a prior conviction. We can find no authority for this 
proposition, nor does reason support it. To the contrary, the 
commentary to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44, incorporated 
into Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 27, specifically indicates 
that, under circumstances in which 1738 is applicable, proof may 
be made either by compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence 
or in compliance with § 1738. 
Section 1738 is designed to ensure that each state and 
federal court provides full faith and credit to appropriately 
authenticated judicial judgments rendered in other states. The 
contents of the "penitentiary packet" challenged in this case would 
be admissible in an Oklahoma criminal court pursuant to the state 
hearsay exception for public records, and 1738 provides no bar to 
its admission here. 
(Footnote and citations omitted, emphasis original.) 
Although the district court acknowledged this specific language from 
Weiland it nevertheless concluded Weiland is distinguishable because "Weiland 
is a federal prosecution, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure apparently allow the interpretation announced in 
Weiland," rules the district court found it was "not free to embrace" in the present 
case. (R., Vol. II, pp.280-81.) While the district court may not be "free to 
embrace" the Federal Rules of Evidence or procedure, this does not render 
Weiland irrelevant. The point of Weiland is that compliance with 28 U.S.C. 5 
1738 has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence - it simply requires a court 
to give full faith and credit to a judgment issued in compliance with that statute. If 
the state rules of evidence permit the admission of certain documentary 
evidence, "§ 1738 provides no bar to its admission." Weiland, 420 F.3d at 1075. 
Like the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Idaho Rules of Evidence provide for the 
admission of the California Judgment, and the district court concluded as much. 
The court's inquiry should have ended there; its further consideration of the 
matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and I.C. § 9-312 was erroneous. This Court 
should, therefore, vacate the district court's order finding Howard "not guilty" of 
the enhancement and remand for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Part II and Part Ill as to Part II and 
remand for resentencing, 
DATED this 13th day of April 2009. 
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